Ukraine Can’t Win Without NCOs and Junior Officers

U.S. Army 2nd Lt. Beau Benton, assigned to the 21st Theater Sustainment Command fires his M4 carbine assault rifle during the 2013 Best Junior Officer Competition, sponsored by U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Bavaria, Germany, Aug. 20, 2013. Public domain

Junior commissioned officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are instrumental in synchronizing and executing medium to large combat operations.

This shortcoming is one of the reasons why Ukraine has been restricted to “bite and hold” missions — where a small platoon-sized element of approximately 30 soldiers (or less) takes ground.

To be clear, I’m not equating the Ukrainian armed forces (AFU) with the train wreck on the Russian side. Ukraine’s army is expanding its capabilities, while simultaneously getting hit with manpower shortages. This puts the AFU under tremendous stress.

Meanwhile, on the Russian side, they are simply using outdated doctrine.

Still, the absence of junior officers and NCOs can be felt on all sides — both Russia and Ukraine struggled to project offensive combat power in 2023 — but this is particularly important as Ukraine adds more inexperienced soldiers to its army.

For these new soldiers to be effective, they need competent “middle managers.”

So, let’s take a look at junior officers and NCOs and examine how they contribute to a combat-capable unit.

Junior Officers

In the U.S. Army, and specifically in the infantry, junior officers are always good for a…